With countries from around the world set to meet in Copenhagen to try to hammer out a post-2012 climate change agreement, no one would disagree that a U.S. commitment to cut greenhouse gas emissions is essential to such a global pact. However, despite U.S. president Obama's recent announcement that he will push for a commitment to cut U.S. greenhouse gas emissions by 17% by 2020, in reality it is questionable whether U.S.
without extending the commitment period to 2030, which would really open the possibility for the U.S. and China to make the commitments that each wants from the other side, the inclusion of border carbon adjustment measures seems essential to secure passage of any U.S. legislation capping its greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, the joint WTO-UNEP report indicates that border carbon adjustment measures might be allowed under the existing WTO rules, depending on specific design features.
Against this background, this paper argues that, on the U.S. side, there is a need to minimize the potential conflicts with WTO provisions in designing such border carbon adjustment measures. The U.S. also needs to explore with its trading partners cooperative sectoral approaches to advancing low-carbon technologies and/or concerted mitigation efforts in a given sector at an international level. Moreover, to increase the prospects for a successful WTO defence of the Waxman-Markey type of border adjustment provision, 1) there should be a period of good faith efforts to reach agreements among the countries concerned before imposing such trade measures; 2) WTO consistency also requires considering alternatives to trade provisions that could be reasonably expected to fulfill the same function but are not inconsistent or less inconsistent with the relevant WTO provisions; and 3) trade provisions should allow importers to submit equivalent emission reduction units that are recognized by international treaties to cover the carbon contents of imported products.
Meanwhile, being targeted by such border carbon adjustment measures, China needs to, at a right time, indicate a serious commitment to address climate change issues to challenge the legitimacy of the U.S. imposing the carbon tariffs by signaling well ahead that it will take on binding absolute emission caps around the year 2030, and needs the three transitional periods of increasing climate obligations before taking on absolute emissions caps. The paper argues that there is a clear need within a climate regime to define comparable efforts towards climate mitigation and adaptation to discipline the use of unilateral trade measures at the international level. As exemplified by export tariffs that China applied on its own during 2006-08, the paper shows that defining the comparability of climate efforts can be to China's advantage. Furthermore, given the fact
I. Introduction
There is a growing consensus that climate change has the potential to seriously damage our natural environment and affect the global economy and thus represents the world's most pressing long-term threat to future prosperity and security. With greenhouse gas emissions embodied in virtually all products produced and traded in every conceivable economic sector, effectively addressing climate change will require a fundamental transformation of our economy and the ways energy is produced and used. This will certainly have a bearing on world trade because it will affect the costs of production of traded products and therefore their competitive positions in the world market. This climate-trade nexus has become the focus of an academic debate (e.g., Bhagwati and Mavroidis, 2007; Charnovitz, 2003; Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007; Swedish National Board of Trade, 2004; The World Bank, 2007; Zhang, 1998 Zhang, , 2004 Zhang, and 2007a Zhang and Assunção, 2004) , and gains increasing attention as governments are taking great efforts to implement the Kyoto Protocol and forge a post-2012 climate change regime to succeed it.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change calls for developed countries to cut their greenhouse gas emissions by 25-40% by 2020 and by 80% by 2050 relative to their 1990 levels, in order to avoid dangerous climate change impacts. In the meantime, under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities", developing countries are allowed to move different speeds as do their developed counterparts. This principle is clearly reflected in the Bali roadmap, which requires developing countries to take "nationally appropriate mitigation actions … in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner". Understandably, the U.S. and other industrialized countries would like to see developing countries, in particular large developing economies, go beyond that because of concerns about their own competitiveness and growing greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries. They are considering unilateral trade measures to "induce" developing countries to do so. This has been a case in the course of debating and voting the U.S. congressional climate bills capping U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. U.S. legislators have pushed for major emerging economies, such as China and India, and require these countries to take comparable climate actions as U.S. does. Otherwise, their products sold on the U.S. market will have to purchase and surrender emissions allowances to cover their carbon contents. This kind of border carbon adjustment measures has raised great concerns about whether they are WTO-consistent and has received heavy criticisms from developing countries.
To date, border adjustment measures in the form of emissions allowance requirements (EAR) under the U.S. proposed cap-and-trade regime are the most concrete unilateral trade measure put forward on the table to level the carbon playing field. If improperly implemented, such measures could disturb the world trade order and trigger trade war.
Because of these potentially far-reaching impacts, this paper will focus on this type of unilateral border adjustment. It requires importers to acquire and surrender emissions allowances corresponding to the embedded carbon contents in their goods from countries that have not taken climate actions comparable to that of home country. Our discussion is mainly on the legality of unilateral EAR under the WTO rules.
2 Section 2 briefly describes the border carbon adjustment measures proposed in the U.S. legislations.
Section 3 deals with the WTO scrutiny of EAR proposed in the U.S. congressional climate bills and methodological challenges in implementing EAR. With current international climate negotiations flawed with a focus on commitments on the two targeted dates of 2020 and 2050, the inclusion of border carbon adjustment measures seems essential to secure passage of any U.S. climate legislation. Given this, Section 4 discuses how China should respond to the U.S. proposed carbon tariffs. The paper ends with some concluding remarks on the needs on the U.S. side to minimize the potential conflicts with WTO provisions in designing such border carbon adjustment measures, and with suggestion for China being targeted by such border measures to effectively deal with the proposed border adjustment measures to its advantage.
2 See Reinaud (2008) for an excellent review of practical issues involved in implementing unilateral EAR.
Proposed border adjustment measures in the U.S. legislations
The notion of border carbon adjustments (BCA) is not an American invention. The idea of using BCA to address the competitiveness concerns as a result of differing climate policy was first floated in the EU, in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol. Dominique de Villepin, the then French prime minister, proposed in November 2006 for carbon tariffs on goods from countries that have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol.
He clearly had the U.S. in mind when contemplating such proposals aimed to get the U.S.
to the table of climate negotiations. However, Peter Mandelson, the then EU trade commissioner dismissed the French proposal as not only a probable breach of trade rules but also "not good politics" (Bounds, 2006) . As a balanced reflection of the divergent views on this issue, the European Commission has suggested that it could implement a "carbon equalization system … with a view to putting EU and non-EU producers on a comparable footing". "Such a system could apply to importers of goods requirements similar to those applicable to installations within the European Union, by requiring the surrender of allowances." (European Commission, 2008) . In light of this, various proposals about carbon equalization systems at the border have been put forward, the most recent one linked to French president Nicolas Sarkozy's proposal for "a carbon tax at the borders of Europe". France will become the largest economy to levy a carbon tax at €17 per ton of CO 2 emissions, which will take into effect in 2010. The president Sarkozy renewed such a call for a European carbon tax on imports when unveiling the details of France's controversial national carbon tax. He defended his position by citing comments from the WTO that such a tax could be compatible with its rules and referring to a similar border carbon adjustment provision under the Waxman-Markey bill in the U.S. House to be discussed in the next three sections, arguing that "I don't see why the US can do it and
Europe cannot" (Hollinger, 2009) . So far, while the EU has considered the possibility of imposing a border allowance adjustment should serious leakage issues arise in the future, it has put this option on hold at least until 2012. The European Commission has proposed using temporary free allocations to address competitiveness concerns in the interim. Its aim is to facilitate a post-2012 climate negotiation while keeping that option in the background as a last resort.
Interestingly, the U.S. legislators not only have embraced such BCA measures that they used to oppose, but also have focused on their design issues in more details. In the U.S. GATT Article XX "Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be constructed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures… (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; … (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption; ..."
The threshold for (b) is higher than for (g), because, in order to fall under (b), the measure must be "necessary", rather than merely "relating to" under (g).
Box 2 Implications of the findings of WTO the shrimp-turtle dispute
To address the decline of sea turtles around the world, in 1989 the U.S. Congress enacted Section 609 of Public Law 101-162 to authorize embargoes on shrimp harvested with commercial fishing technology harmful to sea turtles. The U.S. was challenged in the WTO by India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand in October 1996, after embargoes were leveled against them. The four governments challenged this measure, asserting that the U.S. could not apply its laws to foreign process and production methods. A WTO Dispute Settlement Panel was established in April 1997 to hear the case. The Panel found that the U.S. failed to approach the complainant nations in serious multilateral negotiations before enforcing the U.S. law against those nations. The Panel held that the U.S. shrimp embargo was a class of measures of processes-and-production-methods type and had a serious threat to the multilateral trading system because it conditioned market access on the conservation policies of foreign countries. Thus, it cannot be justified under GATT Article XX. However, the WTO Appellate Body overruled the Panel's reasoning. The Appellate Body held that a WTO member requires from exporting countries compliance, or adoption of, certain policies prescribed by the importing country does not render the measure inconsistent with the WTO obligation. Although the Appellate Body still found that the U.S. shrimp embargo was not justified under GATT Article XX, the decision was not on ground that the U.S. sea turtle law itself was not inconsistent with GATT. Rather, the ruling was on ground that the application of the law constituted "arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination" between WTO members (WTO, 1998). The WTO Appellate Body pointed to a 1996 regional agreement reached at the U.S. initiation, namely the Inter-American Convention on Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles, as evidence of the feasibility of such an approach (WTO, 1998; Berger, 1999) . Here, the Appellate Body again advanced the standing of multilateral environmental treaties (Zhang, 2004; Zhang and Assunção, 2004) . Thus, it follows that this trade dispute under the WTO may have been interpreted as a clear preference for actions taken pursuant to multilateral agreements and/or negotiated through international cooperative arrangements, such as the Kyoto Protocol and its successor. However, this interpretation should be with great caution, because there is no doctrine of stare decisis (namely, "to stand by things decided") in the WTO; the GATT/WTO panels are not bound by previous panel decisions (Zhang and Assunção, 2004) .
Moreover, the WTO Shrimp-Turtle dispute settlement has a bearing on the ongoing discussion on the "comparability" of climate actions in a post-2012 climate change regime. The Appellate Body found that when the U.S. shifted its standard from requiring measures essentially the same as the U.S. measures to "the adoption of a program comparable in effectiveness", this new standard would comply with the WTO disciplines (WTO, 2001, paragraph 144) . Some may view that this case opens the door for U.S. climate legislation that bases trade measures on an evaluation of the comparability of climate actions taken by other trading countries. Comparable action can be interpreted as meaning action comparable in effect as the "comparable in effectiveness" in the ShrimpTurtle dispute. It can also be interpreted as meaning "the comparability of efforts". The Bali Action Plan adopts the latter interpretation, using the terms comparable as a means of ensuring that developed countries undertake commitments comparable to each other (Zhang, 2009a ).
In the case of a WTO dispute, the question will arise whether there are any alternatives to trade provisions that could be reasonably expected to fulfill the same function but are not inconsistent or less inconsistent with the relevant WTO provisions. Take the GATT Thai cigarette dispute as a case in point. Under Section 27 of the Tobacco Act of 1966, Thailand restricted imports of cigarettes and imposed a higher tax rate on imported cigarettes when they were allowed on the three occasions since 1966, namely in 1968-70, 1976 and 1980 . After consultations with Thailand failed to lead to a solution, the U.S. which Thailand could reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its health policy objectives. However, the Panel found the Thai import restriction measure not necessary because Thailand could reasonably be expected to take strict, non-discriminatory labelling and ingredient disclosure regulations and to ban all the direct and indirect advertising, promotion and sponsorship of cigarettes to ensure the quality and reduce the quantity of cigarettes sold in Thailand. These alternative measures are considered WTOconsistent to achieve the same health policy objectives as Thailand now pursues through an import ban on all cigarettes whatever their ingredients (GATT, 1990) . Simply put, in the GATT Thai cigarette dispute, the Dispute Settlement Panel concluded that Thailand had legitimate concerns with health but it had measures available to it other than a trade ban that would be consistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (e.g. bans on advertising) (GATT, 1990).
Indeed, there are alternatives to resorting to trade provisions to protect the U.S. tradesensitive, energy-intensive industries during a period when the U.S. is taking good-faith efforts to negotiate with trading partners on comparable actions. One way to address competitiveness concerns is to initially allocate free emission allowances to those sectors vulnerable to global competition, either totally or partially.
5 Bovenberg and Goulder (2002) found that giving out about 13% of the allowances to fossil fuel suppliers freely instead of auctioning in an emissions trading scheme in the U.S. would be sufficient to prevent their profits with the emissions constraints from falling in comparison with those without the emissions constraints.
There is no disagreement that the allocation of permits to emissions sources is a politically contentious issue. Grandfathering, at least partially grandfathering, helps these well-organized, politically highly-mobilized industries or sectors to save considerable expenditures and thus increases the political acceptability of an emissions trading scheme, although it leads to a higher economic cost than a policy where the allowances are fully auctioned. 6 That explains why the sponsors of the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 had to make a compromise amending it to auction only 15% of the emission permits instead of the initial proposal for auctioning all the emission permits in a proposed cap-and-trade regime in order for it to pass the U.S. House of Representatives Energy and Commerce Committee in May 2009. However, it should be pointed out that although grandfathering is thought of as giving implicit subsidies to these sectors, grandfathering is less trade-distorted than the exemptions from carbon taxes (Zhang, 1998 and , which means that partially grandfathering is even less trade-distorted than the exemptions from carbon taxes. To understand their difference, it is important to bear in mind that grandfathering itself also implies an opportunity cost for firms receiving permits: what matters here is not how firms get your permits, but what firms can sell them for -that is what determines opportunity cost. Thus, even if permits are awarded gratis, firms will value them at their market price. Accordingly, the prices of energy will adjust to reflect the increased scarcity of fossil fuels. This means that regardless of whether emissions permits are given out freely or are auctioned by the government, the effects on energy prices are expected to be the same, although the initial ownership of emissions permits differs among different allocation methods. As a result, relative prices of products will not be distorted relative to their pre-existing levels and switching of demands towards products of those firms whose permits are awarded gratis (the so-called substitution effect) will not be induced by grandfathering. This makes grandfathering different from the exemptions from carbon taxes. In the latter case, there exist substitution effects (Zhang, 1998 and . For example, the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) proposal for a mixed carbon and energy tax 7 provides for raises revenues for the government that can be used to reduce pre-existing distortionary taxes. By contrast, in the former case, no revenue-recycling effect occurs, since no revenues are raised for the government. However, the policy produces the same taxinteraction effect as under the latter case, which tends to reduce employment and investment and thus exacerbates the distortionary effects of pre-existing taxes (Zhang, 1999) . 7 As part of its comprehensive strategy to control CO 2 emissions and increase energy efficiency, a carbon/energy tax has been proposed by the CEC. The CEC proposal is that member states introduce a carbon/energy tax of US$ 3 per barrel oil equivalent in 1993, rising in real terms by US$ 1 a year to US$ 10 per barrel in 2000. After the year 2000 the tax rate will remain at US$ 10 per barrel at 1993 prices. The tax rates are allocated across fuels, with 50% based on carbon content and 50% on energy content (Zhang, 1997) .
exemptions for the six energy-intensive industries (i.e., iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, chemicals, cement, glass, and pulp and paper) from coverage of the CEC tax on grounds of competitiveness. This not only reduces the effectiveness of the CEC tax in achieving its objective of reducing CO 2 emissions, but also makes the industries, which are exempt from paying the CEC tax, improve their competitive position in relation to those industries which are not. Therefore, there will be some switching of demand towards the products of these energy-intensive industries, which is precisely the reaction that such a tax should avoid (Zhang, 1997) . from those states would push for even tough border carbon adjustment provisions that would potentially tax foreign goods at a higher rate if they come from countries that are not taking steps comparable to that of the U.S., which can add to the cost of goods. At this stage the bill does propose to include some form of BCAs, but details still need to be worked out. While Senator Kerry indicates that the proposed provision would comply with the WTO rules, it remains to be seen how the bill, which is put off until Spring 2010 (Talley, 2009) , is going to reconcile potential conflicts between demands for tough border carbon adjustment provisions from coal-producing, industrial and agricultural states and the U.S. international obligations.
Besides the issue of WTO consistency, there will be methodological challenges in implementing an EAR under a cap-and-trade regime, although such practical implementation issues are secondary concerns. Identifying the appropriate carbon contents embodied in traded products will present formidable technical difficulties, given the wide range of technologies in use around the world and very different energy resource endowments and consumption patterns among countries. In the absence of any information regarding the carbon content of the products from exporting countries, importing countries, the U.S. in this case, could adopt either of the two approaches to overcoming information challenge in practical implementation. One is to prescribe the tax rates for the imported product based on U.S. domestically predominant method of production for a like product, which sets the average embedded carbon content of a particular product (Zhang, 1998; Zhang and Assunção, 2004 ). This practice is by no means without foundation. For example, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury has adopted the approach in the tax on imported toxic chemicals under the Superfund Tax (GATT, 1987; Zhang, 1998) .
Alternative is to set the best available technology (BAT) as the reference technology level and then use the average embedded carbon content of a particular product produced with the BAT in applying border carbon adjustments (Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007) .
Generally speaking, developing countries will bear a lower cost based on either of the approaches than using the nation-wide average carbon content of imported products for the country of origin, given that less energy-efficient technologies in developing countries produce products of higher embedded carbon contends than those like products produced by more energy-efficient technologies in the U.S. However, to be more defensible, either of the approaches should allow foreign producers to challenge the carbon contents applied to their products to ensure that they will not pay for more than they have actually emitted.
How should China respond to the U.S. proposed carbon tariffs?
So far, the discussion has been focused on the country that is considering unilateral trade measures. Now that the inclusion of border carbon adjustment measures is widely considered essential to secure passage of any U.S. climate legislation, the question is then how China should respond to the U.S. proposed carbon tariffs.
A serious commitment to find a global solution to the threat of climate change
First of all, China needs to creditably indicate a serious commitment to address climate change issues to challenge the legitimacy of the U.S. imposing the carbon tariffs. It is conceivable that China will argue that its high absolute emission levels are the combined effects of large population and coal-fueled economy and the workshop as the world, the latter of which leads to a hefty chunk of China's emissions embedded in goods that are exported to industrialized countries (Zhang, 2009c Given the fact that China is already the world's largest carbon emitter and its emissions continue to rise rapidly in line with its industrialization and urbanization, China is seen with greater capacity, capability and responsibility. The country is facing great pressure both inside and outside international climate negotiations to exhibit greater ambition. As long as China does not signal well ahead the time when it will take on the emissions caps, it will always be confronted with the threats of trade measures. In responses to these concerns and to put China in a positive position, I propose that China take as its negotiation position for Copenhagen and beyond requiring greenhouse gas emissions in industrialized countries to be cut at least by 80% by 2050 relative to their 1990 levels and per capita emissions for all countries by 2050 no more than the world's average at that time. Moreover, it would be in China's own best interest if, at a right time (e.g., at a time when the U.S. Senate is going to debate and ratify any global deal that would emerge from Copenhagen or later), China signals well ahead that it will take on binding absolute emission caps around the year 2030.
Why around 2030 for timing China's absolute emissions caps?
Many factors need to be taken into consideration in determining the timing for China to take on absolute emissions caps. Assuming the commitment period of five years as the Kyoto Protocol has adopted, I think the fifth commitment period (2028) (2029) (2030) (2031) (2032) (Zhang, 2000) . Given that the scope of economic activities affected by a climate regime is several orders of magnitude larger than those covered by the Montreal Protocol, it is arguable that developing countries should have a grace period much longer than 10 years, after mandatory emission targets for Annex I countries took effect in 2008.
Sixth, while it is not unreasonable to grant China a grace period before taking on emissions caps, it would hardly acceptable to delay the timing beyond 2030. China is already the world's largest carbon emitter and, in the next year or so, will overtake Japan as the world's second largest economy, although its per capita income and emissions are still very low. After another twenty years of rapid development, China's economy will approach that of the world's second-largest emitter (the U.S.) in size, whereas China's capita income will reach a very reasonable level, whereas its per capita emissions are projected to be well above the world's average and about 5.7 times of India (EIA, 2009).
While the country is still on the climbing trajectory of carbon emissions under the business as usual scenario, China will have lost ground by not to taking on emissions caps when the world is facing ever alarming climate change threats and developed countries will have achieved significant emissions reductions by then.
Three transitional periods of increasing climate obligations
It is hard to imagine how China could apply the brakes so sharply as to switch from rapid emissions growth to immediate emissions cuts, without passing through several intermediate phases. After all, China is still a developing country right now, no matter how rapidly it is expected to grow in the future. Assuming the commitment period of five years as the Kyoto Protocol has adopted, I envision that China needs the following three transitional periods of increasing climate obligations, before taking on absolute emissions caps.
First, further credible energy-conservation commitments starting 2013
China has already committed itself to quantified targets on energy conservation and the use of clean energy. It needs to extend its level of ambition, further making credible quantified domestic commitments in these areas for the second commitment period. Such commitments would include but are not limited to continuing to set energy-saving and pollutant control goals in the subsequent national five-year economic blueprints as challenging as the current 11th five-year blueprint does, increasing investment in energy conservation and improving energy efficiency, significantly scaling up the use of renewable energies and other low-carbon technologies, in particular wind power and nuclear power, and doubling or even quadrupling the current unit capacity below which thousands of small, inefficient coal-fired plants need to be decommissioned (Zhang, 2009c) .
Second, voluntary "no lose" emissions targets starting 2018
During this transition period, China could commit to adopting voluntary emission reduction targets. Emissions reductions achieved beyond these "no lose" targets would then be eligible for sale through carbon trading at the same world market price as those of developed countries whose emissions are capped, relative to the lower prices that China currently receives for carbon credits generated from clean development mechanism projects, meaning that China would suffer no net economic loss by adhering to the targets.
Third, binding carbon intensity targets starting 2023, leading to emissions caps around 2030
While China is expected to adopt the carbon intensity target as a domestic commitment in 2011, China adopting binding carbon intensity targets in 2023 as its international commitment would be a significant step towards committing to absolute emissions caps during the subsequent commitment period. At that juncture, having been granted three transition periods, China could then be expected to take on binding emissions caps, starting around 2030 and to aim for the global convergence of per capita emissions by 2050.
A clear need within a climate regime to define comparable efforts towards climate mitigation and adaptation
While indicating, well in advance, that it will take on absolute emissions caps around the year 2030, being targeted by such border carbon adjustment measures, China should make the best use of the forums provided under the UNFCCC and its KP to effectively deal with the proposed measures to its advantage (Zhang, 2009b) . However, China and other leading developing countries appear to be comfortable with WTO rules and institutions defending their interests in any dispute that may arise over unilateral trade measures. Top Chinese official in charge of climate issue and the Brazilian climate ambassador consider the WTO as the proper forum when developing countries are required to purchase emission allowances in the proposed U.S. cap-and-trade regime (Samuelsohn, 2007) . This is reinforced in the Political Declaration of the Leaders of Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa (the so-called G5) in Sapporo, Japan, July Indeed, defining the comparability of climate efforts can be to China's advantage. China has repeatedly emphasized that it has taken many climate mitigation efforts. No country denies that, but at most China has received cheap appreciation of its abatement efforts.
Being praised for such efforts, China is urged to do "a lot more" (Doyle, 2009 Take export tariffs that China applied on its own as a case in point. During 2006-08, the Chinese government levied, on its own, export taxes on a variety of energy and resource intensive products to discourage exports of those products that rely heavily on energy and resources and to save scarce energy and resources (Zhang, 2008) . Given the fact that China is a price setter in world aluminum, cement, iron and steel markets, its export policies have a significant effect on world prices and thus on EU competitiveness (Dröge et al., 2009) . From the point of view of leveling the carbon cost playing field, such export taxes increase the price at which energy-intensive products made in China, such as steel and aluminum, are traded in world markets. For the EU and U.S. producers, such export taxes imposed by their major trading partner on these products take out at least part, if not all, of the competitive pressure that is at the heart of the carbon leakage debates. Being converted into the implicit carbon costs, the average export tariffs of 10-15% applied in China on its own during 2006-08 are estimated to be equivalent to a EU allowance price of 30-43 €/tCO 2 for steel and of 18-26 €/tCO 2 for aluminium (Wang and Voituriez, 2009 
Concluding remarks
With countries from around the world set to meet in Copenhagen in December 2009 to try to hammer out a post-2012 climate change agreement, no one would disagree that a U.S. commitment to cut greenhouse gas emissions is essential to such a global pact.
However, despite U.S. president Obama's recent announcement that he will push for a commitment to cut U.S. greenhouse gas emissions by 17% by 2020, in reality it is questionable whether U.S. Congress will agree to specific emissions cuts, although are not ambitious at all from the perspectives of both the EU and developing countries, without imposing carbon tariffs on Chinese products to the U.S. market, even given China's own recent announcement that it will voluntarily seek to reduce its carbon intensity by 40-45% over the same period.
This dilemma is partly attributed to flaws in current international climate negotiations, Being targeted by such border carbon adjustment measures, China needs to creditably indicate a serious commitment to address climate change issues to challenge the legitimacy of the U.S. imposing the carbon tariffs. Being seen with greater capacity, capability and responsibility, China is facing great pressure both inside and outside international climate negotiations to exhibit greater ambition. As long as China does not signal well ahead the time when it will take on the emissions caps, it will always face the threats of trade measures. In responses to these concerns and to put China in a positive position, the paper proposes that China take as its negotiation position for Copenhagen and beyond requiring greenhouse gas emissions in industrialized countries to be cut at least by 80% by 2050 relative to their 1990 levels and per capita emissions for all countries by 2050 no more than the world's average at that time. Moreover, it would be in China's own best interest if, at a right time (e.g., at a time when the U.S. Senate is going to debate and ratify any global deal that would emerge from Copenhagen or later), China signals well ahead that it will take on binding absolute emission caps around the year 2030.
However, it is hard to imagine how China could apply the brakes so sharply as to switch from rapid emissions growth to immediate emissions cuts, without passing through 
